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COMMERCIAL LAW
PRIORITIES UNDER UCC 9-310
RELINQUISHING AND REGAINING
POSSESSION OF REPAIRED EQUIPMENT
Thorp Commercial Corporation v. Mississippi Road Supply, 348 So.
2d 1016 (Miss. 1977).
On June 9, 1972, Thorp Commercial Corporation purchased a
new International Model 7D-15(C) Power-Shift Crawler Tractor from
Mississippi Road Supply. Four days later Thorp entered into a lease
agreement with James E. Herrin on the equipment. This agreement
gave Thorp a security interest, which was duly recorded.' In April
and May of 1974 Mississippi Road Supply made repairs on the
tractor. Herrin failed to pay for the repairs, and Mississippi Road
Supply subsequently relinquished the tractor to Herrin,2 who shortly
thereafter defaulted on his Thorp lease contract. The tractor was
repossessed by Mississippi Road Supply, and Thorp brought a
replevin action.
An equally divided Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the judg-
ment of the Circuit Court of Hinds County 3.by entering judgment on
a replevin bond in favor of Mississippi Road Supply against Thorp
Commercial Corporation and its surety. The court ruled that
Mississippi Road Supply had made improvements which were
necessary to maintain the equipment in operational condition and to
prevent its depreciation.' Consequently, a lien was created in favor of
Mississippi Road Supply within the meaning of section 75-9-310.1
This lien, the court ruled, continued its priority over Thorp's security
interest, even though Mississippi Road Supply voluntarily parted with
the equipment and subsequently regained its possession. 6 Thorp
Commercial Corporation v. Mississippi Road Supply Company, 348
So. 2d 1016 (Miss. 1977).
'Thorp later assigned its security interest to ITT Industrial Credit Company. Thorp
Commercial Corporation v. Mississippi Road Supply, 348 So. 2d 1010, 1017 (Miss.
1977).
'Prior to relinquishment Mississippi Road Supply attempted to secure payment by
having Herrin execute a promissory note and security agreement. Id.
'Id. at 1018.
1Id. at 1017.
'MIss. CODE ANN. (1972). Section 75-9-310 recognizes the mechanic's common law
lien and gives it priority over a previous security interest.
'Although appellee had maintained that its subsequent security agreement with Her-
in, note 2, was valid, the court made no ruling on this issue. However, in Smith &
Vaile Co. v. Butts, 72 Miss. 269, 270, 16 So. 242, 243 (1894), the court held a mechanic
had not waived his lien by taking other security. An earlier ruling to the same effect had
been laid down in Parberry v. Johnson, 51 Miss. 291, 297 (1875).
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The supreme court reasoned that the repairs were necessary, 7 thus
creating a lien in favor of Mississippi Road Supply as given by section
85-7-101.1 The court further noted that under Mississippi Code sec-
tion 85-7-105' Mississippi Road Supply retained its lien even after it
had parted with possession. Noting that under pre-Uniform Com-
mercial Code law the mechanic's lien had been given priority over a
previously perfected security interest,10 the court held that section
85-7-101 and new section 75-9-310, also creating a possessory lien with
priority over a previously perfected security interest, were to be read
and interpreted in pari materia," and that Mississippi Road Supply,
being restored to the possession of the equipment voluntarily,
therefore had a lien superior to the security interest of Thorp Com-
mercial Corporation as given by the above statutes.'I In reaching this
conclusion, the court stated that there had been no change in the
status or the rights of the parties between the time Mississippi Road
Supply relinquished and regained possession of the equipment.'
In the dissent, Justice Patterson maintained that the legislature's
adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code manifested its intention to
have priorities decided "in a uniform manner, by statute, and not by
choice of debtor or by the result of a race between creditors for posses-
sion."" Section 85-7-105 is silent as to priorities,' 5 and court deci-
sions under it, Justice Patterson argued, were determined by pre-Code
rationales." In addition, section 75-9-310 requires the lienholder to
retain possession of the property as "opposed to relinquishment and
regained possession." ' 7 If this seemed inequitable, Justice Patterson
argued that there were other remedies available to the mechanic."
Justices Sugg, Walker, and Broom joined in the dissent."
'348 So. 2d at 1017.
'MISS. CODE ANN. (1972).
'Id. Section 85-7-105 provides for a continued existence of the lien after the
mechanic voluntarily parts with goods.
1348 So. 2d at 1017.
1'Id. at 1018. For a case presenting a clear working definition of parl materia, see
Dupont v. Mills, 39 Del. 42, 196 A. 168, 177 (1937) (Consistent statutes, though enacted
at different dates, relating to the same subject matter, are treated prospectively and con-
strued together as one act).
2348 So. 2d at 1018.
IId.




"The repairman, according to Justice Patterson, can retain possession as provided
by statute. He can take a security interest in parts used in the repair and give notice to
prior creditors. He can obtain the prior secured party's consent. Finally, upon relin-




The common law mechanic's or artisan's lien could be created only
when the mechanic made repairs or funished services to the owner's
property.2" The lien arose while the property remained in the
mechanic's possession and was said to denote a legal claim or charge
on the property as security for payment of such services or repairs. 2'
The common law decisions further required that the mechanic's im-
provements to the owner's property not only be necessary but also
represent increased value to the owner.22 A further requirement by
many courts was that the owner have consented to the repairs.23
However, many courts were of the inclination that the owner should
not be given the value of improved property without some compensa-
tion to the mechanic; accordingly, numerous ways were found to
reimburse the mechanic for his services."
It was invariably recognized at common law that a mechanic's lien
was in force only as long as the mechanic maintained physical posses-
sion of the repaired article.25  Involuntary relinquishment, however,
was ineffective to destroy the lien. 6 Only when the lienholder volun-
tarily parted with the materials was the lien said to have been lost.27
"See generally 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTEREST IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 33
(1965).
"See generally 53 C.J.S. Liens § 1.
"See, e.g., Funchess v. Pennington, 205 Miss. 500, 513, 39 So. 2d 1, 2 (1949);
Devan Motor Co. v. Bailey, 177 Miss. 441, 449, 171 So. 342, 344 (1936).
"See, e.g., Huntley v. Drummond, 226 Miss. 753, 759, 85 So. 2d 188, 190 (1956)
(Owner's auto repaired by mistake); Smith v. Gardner Hardware Co., 83 Miss. 654, 656
(1903).
2"See, e.g., 177 Miss. at 449, 171 So. at 344. See generally 2 G. GILMORE, supra
note 20, at § 33.3 According to Gilmore, the courts offered the following rationales
for recognizing the mechanic's lien as well as for giving it priority over other existing
debts:
1. The lienholder had increased the value of the property.
2. The holder of the security interest had consented more or less to the repairs.
3. The mortgagor or vendee in possession was held to be an agent of the mortgagee
or vendor who, consequently, had authorized the repairs.
4. The vendee's promise to maintain the property in good condition was held
inconsistent with his promise to keep the property free of liens.
5. The repaired property was found to be income-producing.
6. Repairs were held to be ordered by the owner who was construed as a beneficial
owner.
"See, e.g., Vane v. Newcombe, 132 U.S. 220,239 (1889); accord, Gregory v. Mor-
ris, 96 U.S. 619, 623 (1877) (Possession requirement of lien of vendor of personal pro-
perty); Patapsco Trailer Servs. & Sales, Inc. v. Eastern Frieghtways, Inc., 271 Md. 558,
318 A.2d 817, 821 (1974); Johnson v. Wamble, 205 So. 2d 921, 922 (Miss. 1968);
Stewart v. Flowers, 44 Miss. 513, 518 (1870) (noting the possession requirement of at-
torney's lien by reason of "meritorious and valuable services").
"See, e.g., General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Colwell Diesel, 302 A.2d 595, 597
(Mo. 1973) (loss of lien by replevin action). See generally 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 20
§ 33.
"See, e.g., 132 U.S. at 239; United States v. Crittendon, 563 F.2d 678, 691 (5th Cir.
1977) (Mechanic voluntarily returned tractor after each repair); Hendrickson & Sons
1978]
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LA W REVIEW
Judicial holdings under the common law also invariably noted that the
mechanic's repossession of the repaired materials after voluntary sur-
render did not revive the lien.2'
The mechanic's lien exists in several guises among the states.2 ' In
some it may be found in its original common law form.30 Others have
adopted it virtually unchanged in statutory form.' Some states allow
the mechanic to bring an action to enforce the common law as well as
statutory lien." Finally, there are states which have converted it into
a non-possessory lien.3"
Before the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code, the courts
in the various states were divided on the issue of whether a common
law mechanic's lien, statutory or otherwise, was superior to a prior
security interest, usually that of a conditional vendor.3 ' Statutory law
either did not mention priority, subordinated the lien, or declared the
lien superior." Where it was given priority, differing rationales were
used to support and uphold the legislative enactment. 3
The adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code by the states
settled the issue of priority between the mechanic and the secured par-
ty. The Code in section 9-310 unequivocally gives the mechanic in
possession of goods or equipment that he has repaired, priority over a
prior security interest, even though the mechanic has knowledge of the
security interest and even though the owner has not consented to the
repairs, unless there is a statute that provides otherwise. 3 ' Where the
Motor Co. v. Osha, 331 N.E.2d 743, 757 (Ind. App. 1975) (Auto surrendered after
several repairs).
'See e.g., 318 A.2d at 820; Central Motor Exch. v. Thompson, 236 So. 2d 736, 737
(1970) (Replevin action could not revive lien); 205 So. 2d at 922; People v. Photo, 45
Cal. App. 2d 345, 354, 114 P.2d 71, 76, (1941).





"See, e.g., Gables Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. First Bank & Trust Co., 219 So. 2d 90,
92 (Fla. App. 1969) (Security interest prior to Code enactment was superior to
garageman's lien); Manufacturers Acceptance Corp. v. Gibson, 220 Tenn. 654, 656, 422
S.W.2d 435, 436 (1967) (Court noted priority of artisan's lien under pre-Code Ten-
nessee law); Westlake Fin. Co. v. Spearman, 64 I1. App. 2d 342, 345, 213 N.E.2d 80,
82 (1965) (Court acknowledged priority of holder of conditional sales contract prior to
Code's adoption); 205 Miss. at 512, 39 So. 2d I (burden required for priority of
mechanic claiming lien); Broom v. Dale, 109 Miss. 52, 64, 67 So. 659, 662 (1915) (lien
held to be superior to prior security interest).
"See generally 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 20 § 33.
"d. Gilmore points out that some courts drew analogy with Maritime law, holding
that contract liens ranked in the inverse order of creation, the most recent having priori-
ty. Other courts gave the mechanic the status of a buyer in ordinary course who, conse-
quently, was not charged with constructive notice. See also note 24, supra.




statute is silent, the official comment to section 9-310 states that the
lien takes priority over the security interest.3' Section 9-310 designates
this lien as one having been conferred either by statute or rule of
law. 39 Consequently, decisions based on 9-3 10 have held the common
law requirement of continous possession essential to the mechanic's
right to assert the lien."0
Mississippi, like many of its sister states, adopted the common law
mechanic's lien in statutory form." This section has been judicially
construed as an adoption of the lien given at common law." And,
like some of its sister states, Mississippi, through its legislature and in
an effort to put the mechanic on firmer footing, allowed this
possessory lien, upon surrender by the repairman, to continue to the
same extent it was allowed in cases of liens for purchase-money
goods.' 3 Court decisions under this statute held that the repairer was
given priority over a party with a security interest in the same goods
and upon voluntary surrender of possession had the procedural
remedies of a purchase-money lienor."
4
In 1966 the Mississippi Legislature enacted the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, intending it as "an act to be known as the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, relating to certain commercial transactions ... to make
uniform the law with respect thereto; and repealing inconsistent
legislation. '4 Section 9-310 was enacted verbatim, thus awaiting
judicial interpretation in the Mississippi courts. Inexplicably, in 1968
the legislature amended Mississippi Code section 355 to give the
lienholder the right to enforce his lien as provided in sections 85-7-31
"Id. For a case discussing the weight to be given the official comments, see In Re
Yale Express, Inc., 370 F.2d 433, 437 (2nd Cit. 1966) (comments are "powerful dicta").
"U.C.C. (1972 version).
"See, e.g., Forest Cate Ford v. Fryar, 62 Tenn. App. 572, 465 S.W.2d 882, 884
(1971); 302 A.2d at 601; Pennington v. Alexander, 103 111. App. 2d 145, 242 N.E.2d
788, 789 (1968).
4MISS. CODE ANN. § 1383 (1880) (current version at Miss. CODE ANN. § 85-7-101
(1972)).
"See 109 Miss. at 60, 67 So. at 660.
"Miss. CODE ANN. § 3075 (1906) (amended in 1968) (current version at Miss.
CODE ANN. § 85-7-105). Section 85-7-105 presently gives the mechanic lienholder the
remedies of 85-7-31 and 85-7-53. Section 85-7-31 calls for commencement of suit by fil-
ing affidavit before authorized officer. Section 85-7-53 is applicable where lienholder's
interest is in a steamboat or watercraft. A buyer takes such equipment subject to the
rights of such a lienholder.
"See, e.g., 236 So. 2d at 737; Commercial Sees. Co., Inc. v. Kriner, 53 So. 2d 92
(Miss. 1951); 177 Miss. 441, 171 So. 342. But cf. Turner v. Colonial Fin. Corp., 467
F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1972) tholding Mississippi's replevin statute unconstitutional because
it did not provide for notice and a hearing before seizure of debtor-possessor's proper-
ty).
Apparently, the latter case accounts in part for appellee's failure to use 85-7-31 to
recover the tractor. See Brief for Appellee at 7, n. 1.
4'1966 Miss. Laws Ch. 316 at 431.
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and 85-7-53,"6 although the continued conversion of the possessory
lien (as recognized under common law and as given effect under the
statutory scheme of the Uniform Commercial Code) into a non-
possessory lien was in derogation of its historical treatment"' and
therefore in conflict with the type of lien recognized under section
75-9-310. Which way the Mississippi courts would go or what alter-
native interpretations could be devised did not come squarely before
the supreme court until the instant case was presented for decision."'
An analysis of the opinion in the instant case reveals that the court
found the necessary prerequisites for a valid mechanic's lien under
section 85-7-101. That is, the court found that the repairs to the trac-
tor "were necessary to maintain the tractor in operational condition
and to prevent its depreciation."" The court noted the priority of
Mississippi's mechanic's lien over a security interest under pre-Code
law. 0 Parting with possession, the court held, did not mean loss of
the lien.5 ' The possession requirement for priority under 75-9-310 was
met when Herrin restored the tractor to Mississippi Road Supply."2
As such, 85-7-101, conferring the lien, and 75-9-310, requiring posses-
sion, the court concluded, must be read together as dealing with the
same subject matter, manifesting a clear intent of the legislature to
reverse "long-established principles of law and equity." "1
In finding for the appellee, the court in the instant case makes only
a cursory analysis of the common law lien. Indeed, if its analysis had
been in more depth, the decision would have been rendered in the ap-
pellant's favor. The decision pays homage to the possession require-
ment of the lien but makes no attempt to explain the ramifications of
"Note 43, supra.
"For a discussion of statutes in derogation of the common law, see 3 C. SANDS,
SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONS 61 (4th ed. 1974). For
Mississippi cases dealing with such statutes, see Day v. Hamilton, 237 Miss. 472, 115
So. 2d 300 (1959); Houston v. Holmes, 202 Miss. 300, 32 So. 2d 138 (1947).
"The status of the non-possessory lien in light of a states adoption of UCC 9-310
had been rendered ineffective in jurisdictions considering the question. See, e.g., Balzer
Machinery v. Klineline Sand & Gravel, 271 Or. 596, 533 P.2d 323, 324 (1975); 62 Tenn.
App. 572, 465 S.W.2d at 883;884; 318 A.2d. at 820.
Thorp v. Mississippi Road Supply, however, is the first instance where a mechanic
actually claimed restoration of the lien by subsequent repossession of the repaired
equipment, although there are instances where courts have held repossession did not
revise the lien where no claim was made that it did. See, e.g., 318 A.2d at 821; 114 P.2d
at 76.
Since the Thorp decision, the court on similar facts has upheld its holding in favor of
the mechanic lienholder. ITT Indus. Credit Co. & Fireman's Ins. Co. v. Robinson &
Jones, 350 So. 2d 52 (Miss. 1977).







voluntarily surrendering possession." The issue has never been
squarely before the United States Supreme Court, but dictum in Vane
v. Newcombe" was to the effect that the right to the common law lien
was given up when the lienholder surrendered possession of the equip-
ment.5 In accord are numerous state appellate decisions where the
question of possession was central." In Johnson v. Wamble"' the
Mississippi Supreme Court held the mechanic had lost his lien when he
did not retain possession. 9 There the appellee had made repairs on a
bulldozer which was subsequently sold prior to seizure. Clearly, the
mechanic's lien, as used at common law and as enacted under
Mississippi law, held continuous possession essential.
The opinion of the court in the instant case omits the enforement
provision of 85-7-105.61 Originally, enforcement called for the pro-
cedural remedies of a purchase-money lien" but was later amended to
the remedial guideline of 85-7-31 and 85-7-53. 61 In short, 85-7-105
makes the common law lien of 85-7-101 a nonpossessory lien. Such a
lien, of course, is in derogation of its common law ancestry.' 3 For this
reason, the judicial holdings in this state dealing with loss of posses-
sion maintained that the lien, when voluntarily surrendered, was only
enforceable to the extent of a purchase-money lien." Thus the
lienholder followed the procedure outlined under the purchase-money
section of the Mississippi Code. In no case, however, was it assumed
that a purchase-money lienholder could physically repossess the
goods. As recently as 1970, in Central Motor Exchange ofMississippi
v. Thompson,'" the supreme court held that even a replevin action by
the mechanic lienholder was improper where 85-7-105 mandated the
purchase-money procedures." Logically, such a holding implies that
any action as abrupt as a physical retaking or repossessing, circumven-
"See, e.g., 331 N.E.2d at 755.
"132 U.S. 220.
"Id. at 239.
"See, e.g., 318 A.2d at 821; 302 A.2d at 547; 331 N.E.2d at 755.
"205 So. 2d 921.
"Id. at 922.
-"The lienholder...may enforce the same in like manner as is provided in sections
85-7-31 and 85-7-53." MISS. CODE ANN. (1972).
'See note 43, supra.
62Id.
"The Mississippi Supreme Court has held that "statutes are not to be understood as
effecting a change in the common law beyond that which is clearly indicated." 115 So.
2d at 303.
It is therefor somewhat disconcerting why a similar and more cautious line of
reasoning was not followed in the instant case. The legislative intent here at best is con-
fusing.
"See, e.g., 236 So. 2d at 737; 53 So. 2d at 92; 177 Miss. at 441, 171 So. at 342.
"236 So. 2d 736.
"Id. at 738.
1978]
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
ting any type of judicial condonation, would be invalid. Thus the
retaking of the tractor by Mississippi Road Supply was not a valid en-
forcement of its lien.
The court's reading of 9-310 assumes a navet6 that just is not
present in the commercial world. Although there is definitely a need
for language that is direct, concise, and unequivocal, selected and
straightforward interpretations of the provisions of the Uniform
Commercial Code are not always warranted. Obviously, the inclusion
of official comments to illustrate and interpret the expansive sections
of the Code attests to the truth of the preceding statements. 6' The
court failed to note that 75-9-310" involves those liens given at com-
mon law or by statute.69 In either case, the mechanic has made repairs
and is in possession of the equipment. Therefore all of the rules or re-
quirements for the existence of a valid lien at common law are still ap-
plicable. An essential ingredient of a lienholder's claim to a valid lien
was that he have continuous possession of the equipment." ° If posses-
sion was voluntarily surrendered, the lien was lost.I' Mississippi Road
Supply, after voluntarily releasing the equipment to Herrin, could not
revive its lien by repossessing the goods. This is the thrust of modem
decisions under the Code, although Thorp Commercial Corporation
v. Mississippi Road Supply appears to be the first instance where a
voluntarily surrendered item was later regained by a lienholder who
also reasserted his lien."
The court's dismissal of Forest Cate Ford, Inc. v. Fryar" on
grounds that it involved a nonpossessory lien 7' leaves out several rele-
vant similarities to the instant case. Both cases involve common law
liens, although Mississippi's is in statutory form, as well as non-
possessory statutory liens. In Forest Cate Ford, Inc. the Tennessee
court, referring to the question of priority between a security interest
and a non-possessory mechanic's lien, held the repairman under 9-310
of the Uniform Commercial Code must now retain possession."
"See, e.g., 370 F.2d at 437.
"Miss. CODE ANN. (1972).
6Id.; see also note 39 and text infra at 70.
'°See note 25, supra.
The purpose of the possession requirement, as one federal justice explained, may be
an attempt to draw the line between the repairman's status as a mechanic entitled to
superpriority and his status as a general creditor... .The possession requirement allows
the mechanic to be master of his own fate; he maintains superpriority as long as he re-
tains possession of the collateral.
Thus the mechanic can retain possession or obtain "appropriate releases" from the
secured party. 563 F.2d at 691-692, n. 23. (Crittenden deals with the priority of Federal
Tax liens over a mechanic's lien; however, it applies the provisions of the common law
possessory lien as codified in U.C.C. 9-310 in giving priority to the Federal Tax lien to
the extent the mechanic had relinquished possession of the repaired goods).
"See note 27, supra.
12See note 48, supra.
7"62 Tenn. App. 572, 465 S.W.2d 882.
"348 So. 2d at 1018.
"62 Tenn. App. at 574, 465 S.W.2d at 884. "We conclude the plain import of
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Thus it would not seem unnatural that section 85-7-105 must yield to
75-9-310, which requires continuous possession of the repaired
material.
At this point, it is rather palpable that 85-7-105 and 75-9-310 are in
conflict. And if, as the court seems to maintain, section 85-7-105 is a
continuance of the lien in 85-7-101, which is an enactment of the lien
at common law, then 85-7-101 is also in conflict.7' Therefore, there
can be no pa /materia interpretation of 85-7-101 with 75-9-310 as the
court ruled in the instant case." The decision borders closely on a
legislative enactment; it is not the court's function to make laws
delineating what a legislature intended by certain statutes which are in
conflict and can only be harmonized by a light reading of a Uniform
Commercial Code provision.
Consequently the decision in the instant case places Mississippi law
on priorities between the mechanic lienholder and a party with a
security interest in the same collateral under the umbrella of pre-Code
uncertainty. The legislative intent to have priorities decided in a
uniform manner is thwarted.' This decision renders 75-9-310 ineffec-
tive where the mechanic regains property and the secured party is left
without remedy.
The holding in this case poses many real and unwarranted pro-
blems for the secured party. A number of speculations arise. The
debtor, theoretically, can choose who is to have priority, the mechanic
or the secured party." Competition may arise between them in ob-
taining the collateral.10 Collusion may raise its diabolical head. Sales
and leasing activities may be entered into with some hesitancy by par-
ties accustomed to taking security interests. The mechanic may be
tempted to go after the goods rather than pursue other, more time
consuming avenues. It is possible that litigation in this area will
become more frequent since the good faith compliance with the priori-
ty provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code will now be a guessing
game."
Tenn. Code § 47-9-310 is the repairman must retain possession of the vehicle in order to
maintain priority of his statutory lien...." Id.
"Section 85-7-101 conflicts mainly because the court has chosen to read 85-7-105 as
an extension of the possessory lien. If 85-7-105 is read simply as creating a non-
possessory lien, then there is no conflict with the common law lien delineated in
85-7-101. The conflict thus becomes one between 85-7-105 and 75-9-310. Its resolution
would simply be to construe 85-7-101 and 75-9-310 according to their common law
interpretations as set forth in U.C.C. 9-310 and its official comment, leaving it to the
legislature to provide otherwise. See e.g., 533 P.2d 323.
"348 So. 2d at 1018.
"Id. (Patterson, J., dissenting).
?9Id.
sId.
"Compare the similarities of Mississippi Road Supply's actions in a subsequent
litigation, see 350 So. 2d 52.
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In essence, the value of a uniform system of priorities is negated,
while the legislature's enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code in-
tends the opposite.' 2
Jessie L. Evans
"348 So. 2d 1016 (Patterson, J., dissenting).
